INTRODUCTION
In some intertemporal problems it is important to consider agents who do not discount future utilities but instead attach the same importance to all periods, no matter how far apart they are. This is the case for a social planner who allocates resources among different generations, or for players who greatly value a long time horizon in a repeated strategic interaction. For instance, the celebrated folk theorems of Aumann and Shapley [1] and Rubinstein [20] consider complete patient players, as well as earlier works on infinitely repeated stochastic games (see, e.g., Blackwell and Ferguson [3] ). Complete patient social planners have been considered in growth theory by the literature pioneered by Ramsey [19] .
In the discounted case, the standard criterion used to compare infinite streams of payoffs [x 1 , ..., x n , ...] is (1&$) t=1 $ t&1 u(x t ) for 0<$<1. Without discounting, it seems natural to focus on the limit of the time averages lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 u(x t ). In particular, the following classic result shows that this criterion can be thought of as the limiting case of discounting. u(x t )= lim
However, these limits often do not exist, as the following simple example shows.
Example. Let u(x t ) be the following sequence of zeros and ones:
1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, ... .
It is easy to check that lim T Ä 1ÂT
T t=1 u(x t ) does not exist, and, in particular, we have u(x t )= 2 3 .
Because of this existence problem, the limit of time averages criterion is often replaced by the more general lim inf
u(x t ).
However, no behavioral underpinning for this more general criterion has been provided. As there are many other methods which can be used to rank non-convergent sequences (see, e.g., Hardy [11] ), it is not clear why (1), a rather crude alternative, should be preferred. Moreover, the limit of time averages itself lacks a clear behavioral underpinning; Theorem 1, however interesting, falls short of providing one.
Our approach
In this paper we approach the problem axiomatically. In particular, we look at complete patience and time invariance, the two main features of these time averaging criteria that have been discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole [9] pp. 148 149). For convenience, we briefly summarize the intuitive meanings of these two properties:
1. A time preference reflects complete patience if all periods of time are equally weighted. In the paper we first study the second property. In particular, we prove that time invariance per se would deliver the following criterion:
u(x j+t )
+&
.
Notice that such a limit always exists. After having established this result, we focus on patience. Unlike time invariance, complete patience is much trickier to axiomatize. In the finite case there is a natural definition of complete patience: we have complete patience when the ordering of any two payoff streams does not change by taking arbitrary permutations of their respective time indexes. However, we show that a literal translation of this definition to the infinite case is highly unsatisfactory. In particular, it delivers the following criterion:
where only instantaneous utilities are considered.
To provide a more interesting definition of complete patience we use natural densities. For a given subset of points of time A, its natural density $(A) is defined by These permutations do not change the relative frequencies with which the different payoffs come up in the stream (in section 6 a simple example is provided).
We say that an agent is completely patient when the ordering of two payoff streams does not change by taking permutations that preserve the upper sets' densities. This more compelling definition of patience delivers, up to a technical condition, the following criterion:
We call this criterion the Polya Index. It is well defined for every possible bounded payoff stream. In particular,
when the limit of time averages exists, so that the Polya Index extends the standard limit criterion. This implies that our representation theorem provides a foundation for the limit criterion as well. The Polya Index has an interesting characterization. Let F be the set of all bounded payoff streams, o t a time preference on F that can be represented by the Polya Index, and u(x t ) its corresponding instantaneous utility. Let
that is, F a is the set of all payoff streams that have a well defined limit of time averages. For any given stream x=[x t ] t 1 , it holds that
where P(x) denotes the Polya Index of the stream x. That is, the Polya Index of x is the supremum of the time average limits taken over all streams x$ for which such a limit is well defined, and such that x o t x$. Besides its intrinsic interest, this characterization, together with the original form (2), seems to provide the Polya Index with an interesting analytic tractability. 
Lim inf
Instead of deriving the standard lim inf criterion, our axiomatic approach led us to the Polya Index. However, our analysis also sheds new light on the lim inf criterion. To see why this is the case we have to make a short digression. This work started as a dividend of the analysis of Marinacci [15] . In that paper it was shown that for any bounded sequence 108 MASSIMO MARINACCI 3 As we will prove, it also holds that
This representation seems especially useful in terms of analytical tractability.
f: N Ä R there exists a non-additive normalized measure &:
where an appropriate notion of integral, due to Choquet [5] , is used (see the appendix for details).
As Choquet integrals have been used to model vague subjective beliefs in Schmeidler [21] , this observation suggested the possibility of using that framework to study time preferences. It turned out, however, that the most appropriate framework was the closely connected multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [10] .
We now illustrate this point. In our temporal context we have weights instead of priors, which represent how much the agents value the different points of time. Combined with utilities, different weights deliver different rankings of the payoff streams. In particular, a natural weight for complete patience would be the natural density defined above. However, this density fails to exist for many sets, and so we cannot use it as a weight. Lacking this``ideal'' weight, we assume that agents replace it with sets of weights, in particular with those weights that coincide with the natural density whenever it exists. This is why the multiple priors model is useful for our purposes.
4 By using this model as our set-up we derive the Polya Index. Moreover, we show that there exists a strict subset C l of the set of weights just described such that lim inf
Even though we have not been able to determine which further requirements on preferences are needed to move to the strict subset C l , the equality (4) sheds light on the nature of the lim inf criterion, and on the way in which it combines weights and utilities. In particular, it provides a novel behavioral perspective on the lim inf criterion: an agent who uses such a criterion can be viewed as using a set of weights, all coinciding with the natural density when this``ideal'' weight exists. The set is then summarized through the minimum min + # C l u(x t ) d+.
COMPLETE PATIENCE
In sum, our axiomatic approach to time invariance and complete patience led to some new criteria to rank streams of payoffs, notably the Polya Index, and shed new light on the lim inf criterion, the most used in the non discounted case. As a secondary contribution, we provide a connection between the two apparently unrelated issues of modelling vagueness in subjective beliefs and complete patience in time preferences. Finally, in a companion paper, Marinacci [16] , we show that our axiomatic approach leads to a considerable generalization of the undiscounted Folk Theorems. Specifically, we show that they can be proved by imposing only conditions on preferences, without relying on any particular evaluation functionals. In so doing, we generalize and unify several important results obtained in the case of complete patience, included the classic results of Aumann and Shapley [1] and Rubinstein [20] . Moreover, our results are based only on properties of preferences and this makes transparent their behavioral foundation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup, and reports the representation theorem of Gilboa and Schmeidler [10] . Section 3 examines time invariance, and proves a representation result for this property. Section 4 considers the``naive'' definition of complete patience, and shows what kind of representation result it entails. Section 5 shows how unsatisfactory the naive definition is and argues that natural densities have to be considered. It also shows that a form of patience is already incorporated in the time invariance axiom. Section 6 formally defines patience by means of densities, and proves the relative representation theorem, where the Polya Index first occurs. Section 7 provides two interesting characterizations of the Polya Index. Finally, section 8 considers the lim inf criterion, and shows that our analysis sheds new light on this criterion as well. All the proofs, and the most technical analysis, are relegated to the appendix. A glossary of the more relevant notation is provided at the beginning of the appendix.
SET-UP
We use the generalization of the Anscombe Aumann model introduced in Gilboa and Schmeidler [10] and Schmeidler [21] .
Let X be a nonempty set of consequences and P the set of all probability distributions with finite support on X, i.e., P= { p: X Ä [0, 1] : p(c){0 for finitely many c's in X and :
Let T=[1, ..., t, ...] be the set of points of time, and 2 T its power set. An act f is a function from T into P. For p # P, p* denotes the constant act p*(t)= p for all t # T.
The set of all acts is endowed with a preference ordering o t . In particular, F denotes the set of all bounded acts, i.e., f # F if there are Next we introduce a smoothing axiom: the agent always weakly prefers to smooth his payoff stream by mixing two indifferent acts rather than have only one of them all the time.
A.6. Intertemporal Smoothing. For all f and g in F, f t g implies :f +(1&:) g o t f for all 0<:<1.
Finally, a key ingredient in a temporal decision is how the agents weight the different points of time. In this set-up, where infinite points of time are considered, formally a weight is a set function +: 2 T Ä [0, 1] that satisfies the following conditions:
We can now report the Gilboa and Schmeidler Theorem for our set-up (Chateauneuf [4] proved independently a similar result). 
Finally, the function u is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
Interpreted in our temporal context, this representation means that the agent does not evaluate the payoff streams through a single weight, but instead uses a set of weights, summarized by the minimum
By Theorem 2, every preference relation o t that satisfies axioms A.1-A.6 is associated with a pair (u, C), the utility function on P and the set of multiple weights. Using these pairs it is possible to introduce a natural partial order R on the set of preference relations satisfying axioms A.1 A.6: We write o t R o t $ if the two following conditions are satisfied: (i) the utility functions u and u$ on P are equal, up to positive linear transformations;
(ii) the set C$ is contained in C, i.e., C$ C.
The partial order R is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric. It is easy to see that for two preferences o t and o t $ satisfying axioms A.1 A.6, the following two statements are equivalent:
Definition 3. Let o t be a preference relation that satisfies a given set of axioms, which includes A.1 A.6. We call o t canonical if o t R o t $ for all other preferences o t $ that satisfy the same set of axioms. In other words, a preference relation o t that satisfies a given set of axioms is canonical if it holds that C$ C for all preferences o t $ which satisfy the same set of axioms and have the same utility function on P.
It is important to keep in mind that o t is canonical with respect to a given set of axioms. Indeed, different sets of axioms may be associated with different canonical preference relations.
Comonotonic Independence
In the sequel we will need another axiom, due to Schmeidler [21] . Two acts f and g in F are comonotonic if for no t, t$ # T it holds f (t) o f (t$) and g(t) O g(t$). In other words, f (t) o f (t$) implies g(t) o t g(t$), i.e., two comonotonic acts have the same kind of monotonicity. Consequently, their intertemporal payoff profile has a similar shape and the mixture of two comonotonic acts does not alter the shape. It therefore seems natural to require that this mixture does not change the original preference ordering between the two acts. This motivates the next axiom, a stronger version of A.5.
A.7. Comonotonic Independence. For all pairwise comonotonic acts f, g, h # F and all : # (0, 1), f o t g implies :f +(1&:) h o t :g+(1&:) h. This axiom plays an important role in the representation theorem for non-additive measures proved in Schmeidler [21] , which is reported in the appendix.
TIME INVARIANCE
We first study time invariance. Given an act f # F, define
A.8*. Time Invariance. For every f # F and every k>0 it holds that f t f k .
According to this axiom, the agent puts zero weight on the consequences obtained on all past and present periods, and full weight to the future periods. In other words, it does not matter what happens in any finite set of points of time.
A crucial implication of Theorem 1 is that Time Invariance must be satisfied by any preference relation that aims to model the undiscounted case as a limit case of discounting as $ goes to 1, when such a limit exists. This is a very important feature of Time Invariance.
In the sequel we will sometimes need a very weak independence axiom related to time invariance. A bit of notation: For a set of points of time
In other words, f A is any binary act which gives a higher payoff on A than on A c . In the notation f A we omit explicit reference to p 1 and p 2 since what matters is only their relative order, not their specific values.
This is a very weak notion of independence, and it only involves time invariance. Interestingly, it turns out that A.8 implies A.8* (this is why we have used the star in A.8*).
Proposition 4. Suppose the preference relation o t on F satisfies axioms A.1 A.6 and A.8. Then, it satisfies A.8*. The converse is false (that is, there exist preference relations o t on F that satisfy axioms A.1 A.6 and A.8*, but not A. 8 ).
An example of a utility functional that satisfies A.8* but not A.8 is
i.e., the lim inf of instantaneous utilities.
A Representation
As will be proved in the appendix, A.8 implies in terms of multiple weights that all the weights have to be invariant. 5 As there is no a priori reason to exclude any of these invariant weights, we focus on the maximal set of invariant weights. In other words, we focus on the canonical preference relation that satisfies the set of axioms A.1 A.6 and A.8.
For the canonical preference relation we obtain the following representation result, which provides a complete characterization of time invariance for this natural case.
MASSIMO MARINACCI
5 Let x=[x n ] n 1 be a bounded sequence, and { the shift transformation defined by
Theorem 5. The following two statements are equivalent:
The preference relation o t on F is canonical and satisfies axioms A.1 A.6 and A.8.
(ii) There exists an affine real valued function u on P such that, for all f and g in F, we have, f o t g if and only if
Time Averages
For some payoff streams, the above representation reduces to the comparison of the limits of time averages. Indeed, suppose the time average
This proves the following corollary. 
whenever both lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 u( f( j+t)) and lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 u(g( j+t)) converge uniformly in j.
COMPLETE PATIENCE
6 Recall that it always holds that
for all j 1.
PATIENCE
We now move to the analysis of patience. As was mentioned in the introduction, there is a natural definition of complete patience in the finite case: we have complete patience when the ordering of any two acts does not change by taking arbitrary permutations of their respective time indexes.
It is therefore natural to first look at the direct counterpart in the infinite case of this notion, which is so compelling in the finite case. To do so, let 6 be the set of all one-to-one and onto maps ?: T Ä T. Given an act f # F and a map ? # 6, define
The act f ? is obtained from f through a rearrangement of its elements f (t).
A.9. Naive Patience. For every f # F and every ? # 6, it holds that
This axioms states that the agent evaluates the consequences per se, regardless of the points of time where he gets them. This axiom characterizes an agent with``infinite'' patience for whom all the points of time, no matter how remote, have the same weight. We use the adjective naive because this is the literal translation in the infinite case of the natural notion of patience for finite sets. As will be seen, axiom A.9 is not at all satisfactory. However, before moving on, we show what kind of representation it entails. (ii) There exists an affine utility u: P Ä R such that, for all f and g in F,
The function u is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
Notice that we use the lim inf of the instantaneous utilities and not of their time averages. It is worth noting that we obtain lim sup instead of lim inf in Eq. (5) if we replace A.6 with the dual axiom in which f t g implies :f +(1&:) g O t f for all 0<:<1. Similar dual versions hold for all the representation results in the paper in which lim inf and min occur.
PATIENCE REVISITED
Axiom A.9, which is the literal translation of complete patience from the finite to the infinite horizon, is much stronger than it might seem at a first glance. For example, consider the two acts f and g defined as follows
where p 2 o p 1 . It is easy to check that, according to A.9, it holds that f t g. However, the relative frequency
with which the agent gets the higher consequence p 2 under act f, is twice than that under g, i.e., lim
Nevertheless, by A.9, f t g because this axiom does not take into account the relative frequencies with which payoffs come up.
As this example suggests, we must modify A.9 in order to take care of the relative frequencies. In order to do this, we have to introduce densities.
while the upper natural density is
Finally, a set A T has natural density $(A) if $ * (A)=$*(A)=$(A).
The collection A d =[A T: $(A) exists] has the following properties:
However, A d is not an algebra.
Patience and Time Invariance
A form of patience based on frequencies is already implicit in the Time Invariance axiom A.8. To see it, we need the following definition. 
The following simple example further illustrates the nature of this axiom.
Example. Let f # F be an act such that
This permutation preserves the upper sets' densities, i.e., ? # 6
A Technical Condition
For the representation result we need a technical condition, called regularity. It is introduced in this subsection, which can be skipped at a first reading.
For any p^# P, let [ p^]=[ p: pt p^], i.e., [ p^] is the indifference class containing p^. Similarly, for
We denote by F $ the set of all acts f # F such that the set [A f ] is at most countable.
In other words, if u: P Ä R is an affine utility associated with o t , F $ is the set of all acts f such that [t: u( f (t)) :] Â A d for an at most countable set of : # R. Loosely speaking, F $ is the set of acts``measurable'' w.r.t. A $ . Notice that F d F $ .
As will be seen in the appendix, if f # F $ , and p 0 # P is such that u( p 0 )=0, then f t p 0 whenever u( f (t)) t converges and such that inf t 1 u( f (t))<0<sup t 1 u( f (t)), it holds that f t p 0 .
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We conclude by presenting an interesting class of acts in F $ .
Proposition 13. Let o t be a preference ordering that satisfies A.1 A.6, and u: P Ä R an affine utility provided by Theorem 2. Let f # F. If there exists an l # R such that
then f # F $ .
Remarks. (i) It is easy to check that (7) holds whenever lim t Ä u( f (t)) exists. Hence, by Proposition 13, in this special case f # F $ . (ii) If u( f (t)) 0 for all t 1 and t=1 u( f (t))Ât converges, then, by Kronecker's Lemma
Hence, f # F $ by Proposition 13. This is why in Definition 12 we require that inf t 1 u( f (t))<0<sup t 1 u( f(t)). Otherwise, as just proved, f would automatically be in F $ .
MASSIMO MARINACCI
7 By Kronecker's Lemma, the convergence of t=1 u( f (t))Ât implies lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 u( f (t))=0. However, the converse is false. For example, let u( f (t))=1Âlgt. Then t=1 1Âtlgt= , but lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 1Âlgt=0. 8 It is important to note that, as shown in the last footnote, the convergence of t=1 u( f (t))Ât is a much stronger requirement on f than lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 u( f (t))=0. Therefore, regularity is a much weaker condition than assuming f t p 0 when lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 u( f (t))=0.
Representation Theorem
We can now state the representation result. Theorem 14. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) The preference relation o t on F is canonical, satisfies axioms A.1 A.6, A.8 A.10, and is regular.
(ii) There exists an affine utility u: P Ä R such that, for all f and g in F, we have f o t g if and only if
Given its importance in this work, we now give a name to the functional that comes up in Theorem 14.
Definition 15. Let f # F and u: P Ä R an affine utility function. The functional P: F Ä R defined by
& is called the Polya Index.
Remark. We call P the Polya Index because for the special case of acts f such that u( f (t)) # [0, 1] for all t 1, P( f ) is equal to the Polya minimal density of the set [t: u( f (t))=1]. These densities have been introduced by Polya [18, pp. 556 568] .
Notice that
whenever the limit on the r.h.s. exists. Therefore, the Polya Index is an extension of the limit of time average criterion to streams that do not have well defined time average limits. Using the equality (8), we get the following interesting consequence of Theorem 14. It provides a behavioral underpinning for the use of time averages, provided they exist.
Corollary 16. Suppose the preference relation o t on F satisfies axioms A.1 A.6, A.8, and A.10, and regularity. Then there exists an affine utility u: P Ä R such that, for all f and g in F, f o t g if and only if lim
provided the two limits exist. The function u is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
THE POLYA INDEX
We now provide two further characterizations of the Polya Index.
Polya Index as an Inner Approximation
We first characterize the Polya Index as an inner approximation. For a given f # F, let
Theorem 17. Let o t be the preference ordering of Theorem 14, and u: P Ä R its corresponding affine utility. If u(P)=R (i.e., the range of u is R), for all f # F it holds that
This characterization shows that the Polya Index can be viewed as an inner approximation taken over the less preferred acts that have well defined time average limits. In other words, comparing two acts through the Polya Index is equivalent to comparing them by taking the supremum over the set of all less preferred acts which have well defined time average limits.
The proof of Theorem 17 rests on the following Lemma, which is interesting in itself because it provides the Polya Index with further analytical tractability.
Lemma 18. Let u: P Ä R be the affine utility provided by Theorem 14. If u(P)=R, then, for all f # F, it holds that
u( g(t)): g # F a and u( f (t)) u( g(t)) for all t 1 = .
Polya Index and Weights
Next we characterize the Polya Index in terms of sets of weights. Let {: T Ä T be the shift transformation defined by
We denote by N d the set of all normalized finitely additive measures + on 2 T such that A) ) for all A T, i.e., + is invariant w.r.t. {.
+(A)=+({(
Besides being invariant, the weights in N d coincide with the natural density when it exists. They are the natural weights for complete patience (see the discussion below), and the next result shows that the Polya Index can be justified through them.
Theorem 19. Let u: P Ä R be the affine utility provided by Theorem 14. Then there exists a unique weak*-compact and convex set C p N d such that
Notice that up to a mild technical condition (i.e., regularity), the set C p coincides with N d . The set N d consists of all invariant weights that coincide with the natural density $ whenever it exists. The density $ would be the natural weight for complete patience, but it fails to exist for many sets and cannot be used as a weight. Lacking this``ideal'' weight, we can think of an agent using the Polya Index as replacing it with the set of all invariant weights that coincide with $ whenever it exists, i.e., with the set N d .
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This interpretation of the Polya Index was already outlined in the introduction and it is important because it provides the Polya Index with a behavioral foundation. Interestingly, this interpretation is completely different from that used in the multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler, whose aim is to model vagueness in subjective beliefs.
LIM INF OF TIME AVERAGES
In the last Theorem we have seen how the Polya Index can be represented in terms of weights in N d . We now show that the same is true for the lim inf of time averages.
Theorem 20. Let o t be a preference relation on F that satisfies axioms A.1 A.6, A.8, and A.10, and regularity. Then there exists an affine utility u: P Ä R and a unique non-empty weak*-compact and convex set C l N d of weights on 2 T such that, for all f and g in F,
f o t g if and only if min
This result shows that we can justify lim inf T Ä 1ÂT
T t=1 u( f (t)) through a set of weights C l contained in N d . In particular, C l % C p , as the following result shows.
The set C l is therefore strictly smaller than C p . Some weights in C p have to be eliminated in order to represent lim inf T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 u( f (t)). However, it is not clear what conditions on o t , on top of A.1 A.6, A.8, A.10 and regularity, would lead to this elimination. In other words, it is not clear which further axiom to impose on o t in order to move from C p to the smaller set C l .
Therefore, the behavioral underpinning of the liminf criterion is less transparent than that of the Polya Index. Nevertheless, Theorem 20 is interesting because it sheds light on the liminf criterion by providing a representation where weights and utilities are clearly separated. 
Example
In the introduction we presented an example of a sequence whose limit average does not exist. We now give a more general result that includes the example as a special case. It shows how far apart can be the upper and lower bounds of the partial sums 1ÂT 
Notice that the difference lim sup
tends to 1 as N gets larger and larger. As x takes on only the values 0 and 1, this means that there are sequences for which the lim inf and lim sup are very far away.
Proof. Given N, let x be the sequence whose first N elements are 1, the second N 2 elements are 0, the third N 3 elements are 1, and so forth. It is easy to check that lim sup
as wanted. K
Proposition 4 and Theorem 5
Let l be the set of real sequences x=[x n ] n 1 bounded w.r.t. the supnorm &x&=sup n |x n |, and let {: l Ä l be the shift transformation defined by
A linear functional L: l Ä R is a Banach limit if it satisfies the following conditions. Proof. We first notice that, by Sucheston [22] 
Let F # l . There exists a sequence of simple functions F k that converges uniformly to F. We can write
for all k K = and all j 1. This implies that
On the other hand, assume sup j 1 1Ân
for all k K = and all n 1. The same holds if sup j 1 1Ân
} <= for all k K = and all n 1. In turn, this implies
& and we conclude that
Putting together (10) and (11), we get
Sucheston [22] proves that
As F d+ is a linear functional on l , by Banach [2] | F d+ sup
As to the converse, for any L # L there exists a finitely additive measure on 2
Lemma 24. Suppose the preference relation o t satisfies axioms A.1 A.6, and let C be the convex and compact set provided by Theorem 2. Then C N if and only if o t satisfies A.8.
Without loss of generality, set u( p 1 )=0 and u( p 2 )=1. Then (12) becomes:
This implies
for all + # C. Now, let us consider f A c . Proceeding as above we get
for all + # C, so that C N.
As to the``only if '' part, assume C N. Then, by Lemma 23, u( f ) d+= u( f k ) d+ for all + # C and k 1, so that
for all + # C and k 1. This implies 
where u is the utility function derived from o t using Theorem 2. It is easy to check that o t N # I. As o t is canonical, N C. However, C N by Lemma 24, so that N=C. The converse is obvious. K
Proof of Proposition 4
By Lemma 24, C N, so that, by Lemma 23, min
In turn, this implies f t f k . We now show that the converse is false, i.e., there exists a preference relation o t that satisfies the axioms A.1 A.6 and A.8*, but not A.8. Let u: P Ä R be a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on P. Define o t as follows f o t g if and only if lim inf
for all f, g # F. This ordering o t satisfies axioms A.1 A.6 and A.8. We now show that it does not satisfy A.8*. Let A be the set of odd integers. Set
Therefore, by (13) 
By Lemma 23, min
& and by Sucheston [22] sup
& and this proves the result. K
Proof of Corollary 6
If 1Ân
Theorem 7
A non-additive set function &: 2 T Ä [0, 1] is a capacity if it satisfies:
Of course, all additive measures are capacities, while the converse is false. Let f : T Ä R be a bounded real-valued function on T. The Choquet integral of f with respect to a capacity & is
where the right hand side is a Riemann integral. The integral is well defined because & is monotone. When & is additive, the Choquet integral becomes a standard additive integral. We can now report Schmeidler's Theorem.
Theorem 26. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) The preference relation o t on F satisfies the axioms A.1 A.4, and A.7.
(ii) There exists a unique capacity & on 2
T and an affine real valued function u on P such that for all f and g in F
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 7. T and an affine real valued function u on P such that for all f and
Let p 1 , p 2 # P with p 2 o p 1 . Let A T be a cofinite set, and f A an act defined as follows
Let k be a positive integer such that t<k for all t Â A. Then
By (14) , this implies
Next, let A T be a finite set. By (14) and A.8,
Let A, B T be two infinite sets which are not cofinite. Define two acts f A and f B as follows
As both A and B are not cofinite, there exists a map ? # 6 such that f ? A (t)= f B (?(t)) for all t # T. By A.9, f A t f B . By (14) , this implies 
for all infinite set which are not cofinite.
To summarize, the capacity v has the following form
In other words, & is a filter game defined on the free filter of cofinite sets (see Marinacci [15] ). It can be checked that for the filter game & it holds
for each f # F. By (14), we conclude that (i) O (ii), as wanted. K
Proof of Theorem 10
By Lemmas 23 and 24
Therefore, +(A)=;(A) for all A # A b . W.l.o.g., assume u( f ) is nonnegative. Hence
. K
Proof of Proposition 13
By a result due to Koopman and von Neumann [12] , lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 |u( f (t))&l | =0 implies the existence of a set J T, with $(J)=0, such that lim t Â J u( f (t))=l. We can write If :>l, then [t: u( f (t)) : and t Â J] is finite, while if :<l, then [t: u( f (t)) : and t Â J] is cofinite. In both cases, it belongs to A d . As 
L(x)=lim T Ä 1ÂT
T t=1 x t whenever this limit exists. 3. L (1)=1, where 1 denotes the sequence [1, ..., 1, . ..].
In other words, L c is the set of all positive functionals that coincide with the Cesaro limit of the sequence x when this limit exists. We now prove that all these functionals are Banach limits. This is a simple, but important result, for our purposes.
Proof. Let L # L c . Notice that for all x # l the sequence x&{(x) has a Cesaro limit. For,
As L c is a convex and weak*-compact set, we can define the lower envelope I c on l as follows:
Let V=[x: lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 x t exists]. We now prove a characterization of the envelope.
Theorem 28. For all x # l we have
It is easy to check that I * is a positive homogeneous sublinear functional. Moreover, & <&&x& I * (x) &x&< . I * is a linear functional on V. For a given x~# l , let us look at the linear subspace V _ [x~] generated by V and x~. A typical element of V _ [x~] has the form x+tx~, with x # V and
As I * is a linear functional on V, L as well is a linear functional on V _ [x~]. We show that it is positive. Let x+tx~ 0. There are two cases to consider according to the sign of t: 
and this proves the result because x~was arbitrary. K Corollary 29. Let u: P Ä R be an affine utility. If u(P)=R, for every f # F
It is easy to check that {(A u( f (t))=min
We now consider f # FÂF $ . W.l.o.g., assume inf t 1 u( f (t))<0< sup t 1 u( f (t)). We first decompose u( f (t)) as u( f (t))=x(t)+x$(t) where x, x$#l , lim tÄ x t =lim TÄ 1ÂT T t=1 u( f (t)), and t=1 x$(t)Ât< . Set x$(t)=t[1Ât t k=1 u( f (k))&1Â(t&1) t&1 k=1 u( f (k))]. Simple algebra shows that u( f (t))&x$(t)= 1 t&1 :
and, by setting x(t)=u( f (t))&x$(t), we have lim t Ä x(t)=lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 u( f (t)). On the other hand, u( f (t)) so that t=1 x$(t)Ât is a convergent series. As x t is such that inf t 1 u( f (t)) x(t) sup t 1 u( f (t)), there exists an act g # F such that u(g(t))=x(t) for all t 1. As lim T Ä u(g(t)) =lim T Ä 1ÂT T t=1 u( f (t)), g # F $ (cf. the Remarks after Proposition 13). Hence, u( g(t)) d+=lim T Ä 1ÂT As inf t 1 u( f (t))<0<sup 1 u( f (t)), there exist p* 1 , p* 2 # P such that u( p* 1 )<0<u( p* 2 ). Therefore, there exists :>0 such that :u( p* 1 ) inf t 1
x$(t) sup x$(t) :u( p* 2 ).
As u is affine on P, there exists a 0 * x, t 1 such that :u(* x, t p* 1 + (1&* x, t ) p* 2 )=x$(t). Set g$(t)=* x, t p* 1 +(1&* x, t ) p* 2 so that g$ # F and :u(g$(t))=x$(t) for all t 1. Clearly, t=1 u(g$(t))Ât converges. If u(g$(t)) 0 for all t 1, g$ # F $ (cf. the Remarks after Proposition 13) and
u( g$(t))=0.
Equivalently, for all $>0 there exists # = >0 and N $ such that 1Â(N&M) x t =1Â3. K
